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Abstract 
Discussion of changes to income distribution and inequality 1984/1998 have focused more on tax/transfer/ 
social policies than rewards in the labour market. Yet the tax/transfer system is comparatively minor in effects 
relative to the wide market income distribution from the labour market and other sources (inherited wealth, 
dividends, rents etc). Hence this paper asks whether labour market differentials need to be as wide as they are, 
why they are widening. and whether the economic justifications are real or resemble an emperor with no 
clothes. 
It discusses the standard neoclassical analyses of wage determination and differentials in the labour market 
and their limitations. Issues include whether marginal productivity theory is simply a circular trick, whether 
impeifections are inevitable in labour markets, and whether skills/productivity can be objectively measured. 
Consideration is given to institutional and feminist analyses. The paper concludes that earnings differentials 
within the standard economy are inequitably wide, counterproductive, and only tenuously related to produc-
tivity issues. 
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The jury is still out on the founeen years of economic 're-
forms' in New Zealand and the deregulation/more market/ 
structural reforms internationally, with different verdicts 
dependent on the writer's philosophies/the criteria adopted 
and the weightings of various economic and social indica-
tors. Those di smayed about social exclusion, increasing 
inequality, and victim blaming have tended to concentrate 
heavily on the tax/transfer/social policy areas, with social 
exclusion and work/welfare interlace important themes for 
this conference. I have been concerned with these themes, 
arguing strongly elsewhere (Hyman 1998) for a universal 
basic income. Debates in these areas bring up fundamental 
issues about definitions of work and the arbitrary nature of 
what work is paid in dollars, what is paid or recognised in 
other ways and what is totally unpaid. 
In the labour market, though, the emphases of those op-
posed to current policies has largely focused on job crea-
tion and better sharing of paid work through shorter full 
time weeks and family friendly workplaces, rather than on 
earnings differentials. The latter may seem even harder to 
tackle and/or be regarded as a matter for the impersonal 
market. Yet inequality in market income, from labour earn-
ings and other sources (inherited wealth, dividends, rents 
etc), totally dominates the effects of the tax/transfer sys-
tem, even though transfer payments are vital to those reli-
ant on them. Hence this paper examines the principles un-
derlying labour market differentials and asks why they need 
to be as wide as they are, why they are widening, and 
whether the economic justifications are real or resemble an 
emperor with no clothes. 
For reasons of space, this paper takes as read the facts for 
New Zealand and elsewhere on the increase in differen-
tials in total incomes and earnings over the last 20 years. 
For New Zealand, Podder and Chaterjee (1998) and others 
present evidence on widening total household incomes, 
Manin (1997) on individual and family incomes, and Dixon 
(1996 and at this conference) on earnings. In addition, com-
parisons of contract increases in the public sector and in 
the Industrial Relations Centre database with publicised 
increases for top management speak for themselves. For 
example the State Service Commissioner's report for 1997/ 
8 outlines increased packages averaging 7 to 8% for chief 
executives for the year to June 1998, while wage increases 
for that year averaged about 2%. The lowest chief execu-
tive package was in the $140/150,000 range and the high-
est $310/320,000. This is of course far below the packages 
of many private sector and crown corporation top manag-
ers. Some, sadly even the Privacy Commissioner, argue that 
top salaries should be kept secret, an increasing trend for 
earnings in many areas under labour market deregulation 
and one that makes economic and political analysis even 
harder. I argue that accountability in the public sector and 
to both shareholders and customers in the private sector 
requires disclosure. 
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A number of commentators who are concerned with in-
equality and with the trends of government policy to indi-
vidualism nevertheless regard as reasonable the widening 
of differentials implicit in large wage increases for top 
management. For example, J onathan Boston argued (radio 
interview) with respect to the salary increases just men-
tioned that they were necessary, on the basis of relativity 
with the private sector, to attract sufficiently skilled peo-
ple. By contrast, Angela Foulkes of the CfU argued that 
the responsibilities of public servants such as social work-
ers in CYPS should be compared with those of manage-
ment, and that the large differences in the percentage in-
creases were unjustified. Is labour market inequality, then, 
too hard to tackle - or totally justified? This paper will 
present standard and alternative accounts of wage determi-
nation, discussing whether imperfections are inevitable in 
labour markets and whether skills/productivity differences 
are objectively measurable. It will then look at debates round 
the widening of differentials in recent years . 
Price as the only measure of value? 
Neoclassical economics sees 'objective' valuation through 
price settled by supply and demand on the market as the 
standard concept of value. In what circumstances is it mean-
ingful to judge these as over or under valuations? Econo-
mists do talk of over and undervaluation. Even the strong-
est free market advocates sometimes do so, for example 
stock market commentators discussing volatile share prices 
as against underlying value in the real performance of an 
enterprise. However, market price as the measure of value 
has also long been challenged on deeper levels. "The price 
of wisdom is above rubies" (Job, 28,18), and "A cynic is a 
man who knows the price of everything and the value of 
nothing" (Oscar Wilde, Lady Windemere's Fan)- for cynic, 
read neoclassical economist? The more philosophical chal-
lenges and discussions of value lie outside the scope of this 
paper. Economic and social issues are, however, intermixed. 
Some would argue that low paid child care is of greater 
social value than some high paid work, such as manipulat-
ing futures markets. 
Neo-classical wage determination 
The key demand side concepts are the marginal physical 
and revenue products of labour (MPP and MRP), showing 
the extra output and revenue, respectively, generated at the 
enterprise level by an extra unit of labour with all other 
inputs into production held constant. Diminishing MPP as 
the labour input increases in the short-term, with other in-
puts held constant, is the key to the downward sloping de-
mand curve as an firms' needs for this type of labour are 
aggregated. In perfect competiti on in buying and selling 
the labour, the wage will be set on the market where this 
aggregate demand curve meets the (usually) upward slop-
ing supply curve generated by aggregating the labour sup-
ply at each wage rate of individuals through indifference 
curve analysis of the labour leisure choice. 
This neoclassical world is a tidy one, containing units of 
homogeneous labour, perfect competition, clear distinctions 
between short/ long term and what factors are fixed and 
variable in each, and with defined and measurable produc-
tion functions and demand and supply curves of the usual 
shape yielding stable equilibrium. The analysis implies a 
wage-employment tradeoff, with wage cuts needed to elimi-
nate unemployment. Union action or minimum wage leg-
islation which leads to above equilibrium wages in any 
market will cost jobs. Monopoly supply or monopsony 
demand for labour complicates the situation. With a bilat-
eral monopoly, the outcome is indeterminate. Modern la-
bour economics now blurs the distinctions between neo-
classical and some institutional analyses, recognising the 
reality that markets do not clear (unlike that of New Zea-
land in the 1960s) to eliminate unemployment and incor-
porating some of the complexities of real labour markets . 
More complex models have been developed, involving 
transaction costs, principal-agent theory, insider outsider 
behaviour, efficiency wage theory, bargaining strategies and 
so on. However, the core element of individualistic 
constained optimisation remains crucial, applied where rel-
evant to institutions. 
What of differentials? In neoclassical analysis wage differ-
entials between occupations and industries arise from vari-
ation in supply and demand curves. On the demand side, 
higher levels of skill, training, experience and responsibil-
ity are the 'human capital ' factors which increase the pro-
ductivity of labour and hence increase its demand and wage 
rate. Further, the firm 's efficiency and output market con-
ditions affect its ability to pay, so that the product of simi-
larly qualified labour (MPP) may have different value to 
different employers (MRP). On the supply side, there is a 
need to recoup the costs of training through increased 
wages. As one standard text book puts it: "The most im-
portant basic component of occupational wage differen-
tials is the return on investment in acquiring skills. If a 
skilled occupation is to attract new entrants, the private costs 
of the training needed to enter it must be recouped over the 
recruit's working life with a rate of return equal to the re-
turn on other equally risky invesunents, or equal to the sub-
jective rate of discount used by entrants in making their 
decision" (Rees, 1979, 155-6). Attributes of jobs other than 
salaries are also relevant to the labour supply at any level. 
"The advantages of employment include not only the pay 
and any perquisites or amenities that go with it, but the 
prestige in which it is held and the satisfactions of working 
in it. If an occupation is disagreeable or held in low es-
teem, its pay must be higher to compensate for this" (ibid, 
!55). 
Are earnings differences in reality mainly 
due to productivity/skill differences? 
Is labour different from other commodities? Strong argu-
ments can be made that labour markets will always be dif-
ferent in some significant ways, even though the New Zea-
land Business Round Table (NZBRn and those of similar 
views disagree, consider exploitation by employers to be a 
myth, and wish to abolish separate labour law and courts. 
However, even textbook accounts give credence to the spe-
cial nature of the labour contract. The employment of la-
bour involves a continuing personal relationship between 
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an employer and an employee, whereas transactions in most 
other markets are by comparison brief and impersonal." 
(Rees, 1979: ix). Labour services are inseparable from the 
person offering them, the transaction is of key importance 
to the seller, and the transactions and information costs are 
high. Labour markets are rarely auction markets, and they 
are slow to clear. The non-homogeneity of labour even 
within the same occupation and industry also makes the 
tidy markets of the textbook unrealistic. 
Nor can the issue of power in employer/employee relation-
ships be swept away by NZBRT fiat. The theoretical sym-
metry of the explanatory note to the 1991 Employment 
Contracts Act (ECA) on the increased choices it would give 
employers and employees on representation and on using 
individual or collective employment contracts is seductive, 
but spurious. In practice, there is an inherent power differ-
ence between employers and individual employees, with 
those selling their labour, unless it is particularly scarce, in 
the less powerful position. While some of these character-
istics apply to a number of other markets, I argue that their 
conjunction makes the 'labour is different' case convinc-
ing and the standard account of wage detennination and 
differentials in need of careful scrutiny. 
How, then , are wages set according to other accounts? In-
dustrial relations texts take a more multidisciplinary ap-
proach than that seen in labour economics books. For ex-
ample, one New Zealand text lists six major determinants 
of wages, namely the nature of the work, scarcity, status 
and social esteem, collective bargaining, government ac-
tion, and individual and group performance (Deeks and 
Boxall, 1989). Of course all of these can be fitted into a 
supply and demand analysis, but they show a change of 
emphasis over the purity of that framework. Industrial re-
lations theoreticians and practitioners acknowledge the role 
of institutions and key actors in wage determination. 
Whether centralised bargaining systems and wage rounds 
or individualised systems and contract negotiations are in-
volved, the results rest very heavily on relative power, and 
differentials change only slowly, with historical and social 
detenninants as important as supply and demand. Using an 
adverse change in differentials as an argument for a wage 
increase may be less telling now than under the award sys-
tem, but such differentials are still hard to change rapidly. 
Also important are concerns about the whole basis of the 
orthodox analysis of the demand for labour. Whether, ex-
cept in economists' graphs, maiginal productivity can be 
measured is unclear, while the argument that the market 
reflects the concept even if it is numerically unmeasurable 
is specious. "Individual productivity is unknown and vari-
able" (Thurow, 1975). Teamwork, the dependence of every 
type of worker on the work of others, the other inputs that 
are held constant in the analysis, and the quality of man-
agement are among factors which blur the picture. Homo-
geneous labour markets gloss over the distinction between 
the job itself and the person in the job. Further, marginal 
productivity can be seen as an economist's circular trick. 
Analytically, the wage rate must reflect the value to the 
employer of the extra amount produced (in perfect compe-
tition at least). However, only the wage is observed, so it is 
simply presumed to reflect marginal product. This can per-
suade people that there is a false objectivity to the wage 
detennination process. Maixist theory, too, has asserted the 
incoherence of the marginal productivity theory of labour 
demand. 
There is, of course, increasing recognition of the fact that 
jobs are not homogenous. Performance assessment and re-
view is common in many jobs, with part of the pay pack-
age often dependent on this. The success of an organisa-
tion and the major role of senior executives in such success 
is often given as the reason for the substantial management 
increases discussed earlier. This emphasises individual per-
formance and responsibility, yet in a post-Fordist world, 
teamwork is receiving more and more emphasis. This is 
sometimes acknowleged in rewards for group or total en-
terprise performance rather than that of individuals, but 
basic wage structures and emphasis on top management do 
not reflect this. 
The service sector now employs over two thirds of the 
workforce. It is not coincidence that the test book exam-
ples of marginal productivity are usually in agriculture or 
manufacturing. The extra apples picked or widgets made 
by one extra labour hour with the same other inputs is easy 
to grasp: though even then the conditions may not be the 
same: some trees have apples at different heights from oth-
ers. However in service occupations, the value of output is 
often much harder to measure, which is demonstrated by 
the fact that in national accounts, some value added is in 
fact estimated from the input side. Much attention is now 
paid to the principal agent problem, which essentially rec-
ognises this issue. Employers need to find ways of ensur-
ing they receive the work input for which they are paying. 
Hence the attempts to assess individual and team perform-
ance, but they are often crude and subjective, with many of 
the output measures open to question panicularly in evalu-
ation of quality. 
A neoclassical reply to the challenges to orthodoxy dis-
cussed above would aigue that most problems are a result 
of distortions preventing a perfect competitive market from 
operating, so that gender, bargaining power, and historical 
biases will disappear (or even have already disappeared) in 
a deregulated market where competition operates 
untramelled. Certainly, deregulation has reduced the power 
of unions and of professional associations over entry limi-
tations, wages, and maintenance of differentials, which 
could in theory inhibit the perpetuation of gender discrimi-
nating relativities between occupations. However, the more 
basic critiques, involving power imbalances and the limi-
tations of the basic theory, imply that perfect competition 
in labour markets is not a logically coherent option. 
Turning specifically to differentials, it was noted that in 
the orthodox story outlined above, quality of conditions 
will be inversely related to pay level, ceteris paribus. Does 
this reflect realities? Do high prestige, secure occupations, 
with recruits easily attracted, pay less than those involving 
comparable training but lower prestige, particularly when 
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numbers entering many professions are controlled by pro-
fessional assoyiations, universities and/or governments? Are 
there many accountants or doctors who would switch to 
manual work if they could increase their pay by so doing? 
Professional and management jobs often appear to be able 
to charge almost what they like, within some limits. Femi-
nists and other critics of orthodoxy have many doubts about 
these 'stories', with a fairly recent trend among even some 
neoclassically inclined economists being to acknowledge 
that much of the theory is rhetoric or story telling, attempt-
ing to persuade rather than reveal an objective truth (see 
McCloskey, 1985 and also Strassman, 1993, for a feminist 
interpretation). 
The basic story told above is that provision of sufficient 
skilled labour through adequate human capital acquisition 
requires incentives to cover the costs of training, including 
foregone earnings. While there may be some truth in this 
(see also section on widening differentials below) up to 
certain pay levels, it hardly applies to top earnings. Here, 
one must appeal to alternative opportunities elsewhere in 
New Zealand and overseas - which does not account for 
how the general level of top salaries comes to be so high. 
For an area where beliefs are so strong, it is suprising how 
little real evidence there is on the role of financial incen-
tives in the ability to recruit and retain top staff. At that 
level, and indeed at lower levels too, according to a number 
of surveys, it is likely that the job itself, its conditions, pros-
pects and influence, are considerably more important than 
thi exact dollar amount of the package. 
It is interesting that the literature has plenty of material on 
aggregate wage movements, their cause and impact, on in-
stitutional wage setting in practice, on rates of return to 
education and on individual labour markets. By contrast 
there is curiously little written on the historical evolution 
of overall pay structures and relativities, and whether they 
are reasonable. Perhaps this is because current structures 
largely benefit those who make the key decisions. In the 
standard analysis of occupational differentials, it is assumed 
that the relationships of skills to productivity are clear, 
whereas there is a growing literature arguing that skill evalu-
ation is largely socially determined. With skill definition 
and assessment very much a social construct, the skills in· 
volved in many jobs can be undervalued or ignored. 
(Cockburn , 1983, Hill and Novitz, 1985, Hyman, 1994, 
Kusterer, 1978, Wood, 1985). 
One aspect of this possible undervaluation which has re-
ceived much attention is in female dominated occupations. 
If skills needed in such work are undervalued for hi stori-
cal, institutional, and social reasons, such as the emphasis 
on a male family wage, if maintenance of differentials per-
petuate this over time, and if training acquired in unpaid 
work at home is seen as needing no economic rerum, then 
pay in such occupations may be lower than productivity 
factors would justify. For example, dexterity and the abil-
ity to undertake repetitive accurate work may be seen as 
natural to women and rewarded less than demands of some 
male dominated jobs, such as heavy lifting. Statistical fit-
ting of earnings functions, to attempt to decide what pro-
portion of the gender earnings gap is due to differences in 
human capital endowments and what proportion to di ffer-
ence in coefficients or returns to those endowments, have 
yielded ambiguous results. 
While I have argued that earnings levels qua se, beyond 
very low levels, can be overestimated in their importance 
to employees, the perceived fairness or otherwise of those 
earnings have been shown to have a key role in job satis-
faction and working productively. Comparisons may be 
made both fairly narrowly, within the same type of work in 
the same firm, and more broadly, at the level of the whole 
labour market. Tim Hazledine argues that low unemploy-
ment and low differentials observed in New Zealand in the 
1950's and 1960's arose from the macro level equivalent 
of micro leveUfamily economic sharing, based on a shared 
understanding about reasonable behaviour and a "willing-
ness to share reasonably the frui ts of cooperative endeav· 
our" (Hazledine, 1998 p 171). The social cohesiveness and 
cooperation produced by feelings of fairness , collective 
wage settlements, and low, slow·changing differentials 
implied a social contract and codes of behaviour under 
which a high-wage, high-employment situation was sus-
tainable. But all this was torn apart by the individualistic 
philosophy embodied in the 1991 ECA. 
Why are differentials widening? 
Differentials generally and between CEO's pay. rates and 
o thers are certainly widening throughout the capitalis t 
world. According to the Economic Policy Institute 's 1996 
State of Working America, a sample ofCEO salaries show 
a widening of the gap between CEO's and the average 
worker from 60 to I in 1978, through 122 to 1 in 1989, to 
173 to 1 in 1995. New Zealand would be somewhat less 
extreme, though we do not have comparable data. How-
ever, Alan Bollard 's salary is some 25 times the minimum 
wage, while million dollar annual packages, no longer un-
common, are around 70 times the minimum. Of course the 
extremes are greater than that, with some much higher sala-
ries, while some employees are paid below the legal mini-
mum rate, which itself was not increased in 1998 despite a 
coalition promise to raise it to $7.50 per hour. 
The neoclassical reply to why differentials are widening 
would be that this reflects higher returns to scarce skills, 
with top salaries reflecting high productivity, responsibil-
ity, and performance in an increasingly complex and tech-
nologically advanced environment. The high salaries are 
needed as incentives to retain top management and profes-
sionals, who would otherwise move to higher paid jobs 
locally and overseas in a free market. Low pay, by con-
trast, is for low skilled work which is plentiful with com-
paratively high unemployment. It also sends signals to those 
with few skills and qualifications that they need to under-
take education and training. The differentials are now, this 
position argues, closer than in earlier years to where they 
should be, as they were previously artificially narrow due 
largely to over egalitarian attitudes and outmoded indus-
trial relations/collective bargaining systems with central-
ised award systems in New Zealand. All will benefit from 
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the faster growth, increases in employment, and higher pro-
ductivity which the incentives for those at the top bring 
about. 
Hence resistance to very high salaries for CEO's, consult-
ants, and public relations experts employed to 'sell ' health 
sector policies of uncertain merit is labelled by politicians 
and adherents to current orthodoxy as misguided or simply 
the politics of envy. CEO's are worth that much due to their 
overwhelming responsibilities, and ability to go elsewhere 
if not paid a competiti ve salary. Further, they may argue, 
the number of people involved is fairly low and so the over-
all proportion of national income involved insignificant. 
Can there then be any question of top earnings being too 
high and bottom ones too low, even though they have wid-
ened considerably? 
Counters to the productivity and skill arguments have been 
advanced earlier. Top salaries may largely reflect decision 
makers able to set for each other their own prices. Further, 
the impact of high management salaries is greater than may 
appear, spreading the whole pay structure. For example 
Fletcher Challenge's 1996 annual report showed 2,301 
employees earning over $100,000 per year for a total of 
$292 million (Hazledine, 1998). Overall, the ratio of man-
agers to 'transformation workers ' (omitting most of those 
providing services) has risen from about 1 in 20 in 1960 to 
almost 1 in 4 in 1996, which can be seen as "apparently, a 
massive decline in managerial productivity" and a result of 
increased complexity in a more open market economy with 
such an economy "more costly to operate than one based 
on centralised rules and customs" (ibid p 124). Commer-
cialisation and contestability requires "inexorably more 
managers and associated support staff, to call tenders, to 
draw up contracts, and to monitor the efforts of workers 
who previously, in the cooperative setting, could be relied 
on to monitor themselves" (ibid p 125). Ironically, a post 
Fordist shift to teamwork, multiskilling, and other forms 
of labour market flexibility, with less job demarcation, was 
supposed to cut down management numbers and levels and 
avoid some transactions costs. 
Theoretically, the ECA was aimed at encouraging labour 
market flexibility and higher productivity through encour-
aging cooperation rather than conflict between labour and 
management, although Hazledine's arguments mentioned 
earlier imply that the reverse was more likely. In reality, 
the legislation was also intended to shift the balance of 
power sharply towards employers and away from unions. 
The main reasons for the widening of differentials are the 
shift in economic conditions and policies which make it a 
buyer 's market for jobs defined as lower skilled, and the 
industrial relations framework changes embodied in the Act 
designed precisely to achieve this. It was intended to keep 
real average wages down as well as widen differentials, 
both in line with the individualistic philosophy of govern-
ment and to lower wages at the bottom to reduce labour 
costs. The resullS in terms of lowering of some base wages, 
removal of overtime and penal rates, and work intensifica-
tion is well documented elsewhere (for example, Dannin 
!997). 
There is, of course, some truth in the incentive arguments 
when the labour market, here and overseas, runs this way. 
High priced labour is indeed mobile, even though it can be 
argued that it is more a matter of what the market will bear, 
how decision makers reward themselves and each other, 
rather than real productivity differences. And the incentive 
of probable high earnings may be more necessary than in 
earlier years, when education has become more costly with 
high fees , sharply targetted living allowances, high real 
interest loans, and decreased access to paid work/benefit 
assistance in vacations. Rates of return to higher education 
are still reasonable in most areas, but only because the wid-
ening differentials match the increased costs. This illus-
trates the linked nature of the policy and system changes 
which make it harder to reverse them in any individual area. 
However, many of the other points above are open to strong 
challenge. Even the general need for more education and 
training needs careful examination. Many shades of politi-
cal and economic opinion call for this, and yet some of the 
inflation in demands for qualifications is credentialism, 
while many graduates have difficulty in finding employ-
ment, particularly in their areas of expertise. 
As a university teacher, I certainly do not oppose a greater 
proportion of each cohort having access to higher educa-
tion, but it must be recognised that this is as much for wider 
mind-opening reasons as its direct usage in paid work, with 
much general education being only indirectly applicable in 
the labour market. It is also ironic that the call for more 
trained people comes at a time when free market philoso-
phy means eschewing any planning of what types of la-
bour and skills are required. Of course, it might be highly 
desirable for New Zealand to become a high skilled, high 
employment, high productivity, high wage economy, ex-
porting technologically advanced products and services to 
niche markets. However, we are in fact moving ever faster 
toward a dual economy, of fu ll time, well paid jobs with 
good conditions contrasting with part time, casualised, in-
secure jobs defined as low skilled, with low pay and poor 
conditions. 
Further, the argument that all are benefitting ("trickle 
down") from the faster growth, increases in employment, 
and higher productivity which the economic "reforms" in-
cluding improved incentives for those at the top bring about, 
does not stand up to scrutiny. New Zealand's growth over 
the total period from the 1984 start of the "refonns" has 
been lamentable, while neither export nor productivity per-
formance is at all impressive. On exports, Singapore, Nor-
way, and Ireland, all of similar population size to New Zea-
land, currently each have higher GDP per capita and they 
export, respectively, goods and services worth about 117%, 
39%, and 70% of GDP, against New Zealand 's 21%. Ire-
land has increased its exports by ll times as much as New 
Zealand since 1984. And despite NZBRT attempts to choose 
the best time periods to establish rising productivity, in fact 
aggregate labour productivity has grown even more slowly 
since the passage of the ECA than the rather poor perfonn-
ance earlier- with 2% per year overall from 1979 to 1992, 
according to Victoria University PEP figures, being unim-
pressive. NZIER estimates show only a 3. 1% rise in labour 
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productivity from 1991 to 1996, as against 10.6% in the 
previous five years, with even the small post-1991 gains at 
least partly due to labour shedding which results in ''inten-
sifying the exploitation of labour, ie. by using the threat of 
redundancy and closure to make people work harder" 
(Harris and Twiname, p 137). 
Conclusion 
I have discussed whether labour market differentials need 
to be as wide as they are, why they are widening, and 
whether the economic justifications are real or resemble an 
emperor with no clothes. Clearly supply and demand analy-
sis, skill level differences and the role of relative scarcity 
in valuing them, and the need for incentives are not totally 
a matter of myth, but they are often exaggerated to widen 
differentials and benefit powerful groups. So overall, I ar-
gue that the economic justifications for very wide differen-
tials are largely spurious, but self reinforcing, so that the 
current economic wisdom and capitalist/more market wis-
dom operating world wide makes it extremely difficult to 
reverse the trends in the near future. Differentials are wid-
ening due to deliberate policy, and this serves the interests 
of those in power positions of all types . 
More radically, how reasonable is the notion of the value 
of an honest hour of labour being the same, whatever the 
type of work? Probably more people would have sympa-
thy with the idea, if it is put that way, than if it was pro-
posed that all hourly earnings should be the same, what-
ever the type of work. This illustrates that a distinction be-
tween value and price may certainly exist in people's minds, 
irrespective of economic theory. But of course many Time 
Dollars schemes do use the principle of strict equality for 
the value of time in earnings equivalents. "1 hour, 1 credit, 
whether the task is doing laundry or helping someone with 
his (sic) taxes. Every resident's time is considered just as 
valuable as anyone else's" (Cahn and Rowe, 1992, p 6). 
And some types of enterprises which pay in real dollars, 
including among their aims social justice elements, have 
also adopted equal hourly rates for all types of paid work. 
One example is the New Zealand feminist magazine, Broad-
sheet, over all of its 25 year history. Almost all local eco-
nomic rrading schemes (LETS, Time Dollars, Green Dol-
lars etc.), even where allowing people to put varying val-
ues on their time, produce lesser differentials between dif-
ferent types of work than in the market economy. The value 
systems of participants, including those of professionals 
who may be able to command high hourly rates elsewhere, 
support this. 
Identical hourly earnings for all is obviously "out of the 
ballpark" in practical terms, but hopefully is food for 
thought and allows less radical views which still deplore 
recent changes to seem moderate. Hence I finish with Tim 
Hazledine's such thoughts: "Of course economic forces will 
play their role in the way earnings relativities evolve- with 
some premium paid for investments in human capital (train-
ing) and with some (though temporary) reward for skills in 
short supply - but in a civilised society these forces are 
quite tightly consrrained by moral and social considera-
tions ... It is in fact very sensible to have people earning 
good wages in good jobs, for all those social, psychologi-
cal, moral reasons the economic importance of which (in 
building and sustaining social capital) I have stressed .. . 
There are plenty of good reasons why some people doing 
some jobs will be paid more than others. But if we don't 
get a tolerable income distribution at source - in the pay 
packets- we will never get it. So if not equal pay, we must 
insist on fair shares. This means reversing the past dec-
ade's trend towards a hollowing out of the income distri-
bution in the name of 'international competitiveness' : top 
people paying themselves more and paying those at the 
bottom less (Hazledine, 1998, p 113,163 and 172). 
Future research 
Since this is more of a 'think piece' than a piece of empiri-
cal research, the directions for future research will depend 
largely on the perspective of the reader. My own sugges-
tions are firstly that we need far better information than we 
have now on the actual earnings/rewards structures in the 
labour market as a starting point for analysis - one impact 
of the ECA has been increased secrecy and less informa-
tion in this area. The Household Labour Force Survey ex-
tra questions on earnings may be a useful beginning. Re-
lating hourly, weekly and annual earnings, basic and ex-
tras, such as performance pay, by type of job, to human 
capital variables, is desirable, but probably beyond avail-
able data. Analyses need to be carried out at various levels, 
from the individual firm to the total labour market. Indi-
vidual fums could benefit from thorough statistical analy-
ses of their own remuneration structures to investigate how 
their explicit policies and values compare with the actual 
outcomes. However, being allowed to do this in such a way 
that important results with implications elsewhere could 
be made public is a problem. Some United States state gov-
ernment pay system 'policy capturing' studies for compa-
rable worth/gender equity purposes were highly revealing 
about what was va1ued (see Hyman, 1994, p 1 04/6). More 
openness in this whole area and discussion of the issues is 
important to a restoration of a greater degress of social co-
hesion in New Zealand. 
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